A growing number of studies have documented that financial intermediaries improve information quality, which, in turn, optimizes resource allocation. In particular, one important type of financial intermediary, underwriters signal and certify issuer earnings quality during initial public offerings (IPOs). Reputable underwriters mitigate information asymmetry between issuers and public investors, reduce issuers' costs of raising capital (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Dai, Jo, and Schatzberg, 2010) , and in general, enhance long-term returns to issuers and market efficiency (Carter, Dark, and Singh, 1998; Bharat and Kini, 1999; Jo, Kim, and Park, 2007; Dong, Michel, and Pandes, 2011) .
However, the existing evidence is derived from developed markets and may not be equally applicable to transitional markets, such as China, for the following reasons. First, one of a transitional market's most important characteristics is government intervention in the capital market, which may affect the role of financial intermediaries. In China, the government plays dual roles in the capital market. It not only sets regulatory policies, but also participates in economic activities. For example, from 2002 to 2008, nearly 49% of issuers were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). When compared with developed markets, this feature of government ownership affects underwriters' incentives to supervise their clients, as well as their behavior in obtaining clients. Additionally, transitional markets are often criticized for their weak enforcement of investor protections (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) . Without proper incentives and/or strong enforcement mechanisms, underwriters may not act in the best interest of investors. Consequently, it is important to note that the underwriter's role in improving market efficiency is constrained by the institutional background.
As one of the fastest growing markets in the world, China was ranked the second largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (Bloomberg, 2010) in 2010 and its IPO market had become the most active in terms of the number of issuers and total issuing amount. For instance, in 2010, a total of 345 issuers were successfully listed on China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, with a total issuing amount of about $81 billion USD (the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 2010). Therefore, it is important for researchers to provide more insight into this rapidly growing IPO market.
China keeps its IPO process under strict regulatory control. Appendix A illustrates how a potential issuer proceeds through an IPO and becomes publicly listed. As demonstrated in Appendix A, the CSRC, a government-controlled regulatory institution, has the right of final approval in the qualification of new issues. However, reforms (see Appendix B for a detailed discussion on these reforms) have been undertaken since 2001 aimed at strengthening the role of market agents, especially underwriters, in enhancing the efficiency of the IPO process. Underwriters now participate in the IPO process and lead a consultancy team that includes auditors and lawyers. They advise issuers on corporate governance, financial systems, and regulatory compliance, as well as corporate restructuring. The CSRC has also specified that the lead underwriter of an underwriting project should be responsible for truthfulness of disclosure. If a false statement is found, a penalty of up to five years in prison is imposed upon the signing project leader. In addition, the underwriter is responsible to the issuer for up to two years after the IPO if post-IPO financial performance deteriorates significantly. Moreover, since 2004, the CSRC has adopted a "sponsor" system (i.e., Step 8 in Appendix A). Investment banks employ a sponsor whose career is directly related to the issuer's disclosure quality and post-IPO financial performance. Given the critical role of underwriters in the IPO process in China, it is important to investigate the effects of the underwriter role on pre-IPO accounting quality and post-IPO peformance.
Additionally although the equity financing market in China functioned primarily for SOEs prior to 2000, an increasing number of non-SOEs (NSOEs) have recently become important players in the capital market, resulting in a market that consists of firms with different ownership structures. Public investors can view the government as an implicit guarantee of an SOE issuer's underlying value for the following reasons. First, when compared with NSOEs, SOEs enjoy organizational legitimacy and favorable access to valuable information about the policy process. SOEs are often provided with preferential financial treatment and less policy discrimination (Huang, 2003) . With the government's support, SOEs usually enjoy favorable access to bank loans (Brandt and Li, 2003) , lower costs of capital (Borisova and Megginson, 2011) , monopoly advantages (Li, 2009) , and higher growth performance relative to their industry counterparts (Lin and Germain, 2003) . Moreover, in the case of financial distress, SOEs are more likely to receive government bailouts. For example, during the 2008 financial crisis, PetroChina, a huge oil producer and distributor controlled by the central government of China, was granted a government subsidy of RMB 16.9 billion, 12.34% of its net income that year. Thus, when compared with NSOE issuers, SOE issuers are less likely to be adversely viewed by investors. In this case, underwriters of different issuers are associated with different incentives in the underwriting task. Therefore, despite common regulations, underwriters' roles may be different for firms with different ownership backgrounds. Chen and Xu (2011) examine the determinants of underwriters' market shares in China and find that underwriters with different characteristics tend to have different target clients and behave differently in SOE and NSOE markets. In short, the unique feature of the Chinese capital market, consisting of firms with different ownership backgrounds under the same regulations and identical macroeconomic conditions, allows us to investigate the different impact of underwriters on accounting information quality and, in turn, post-IPO performance within different institutional contexts.
Specifically, this paper investigates the role of underwriters in restricting earnings management during the IPO process for issuers of different ownership backgrounds. We focus on earnings management as IPO pricing depends heavily upon pre-IPO accounting earnings (Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998; Liu, Nissim, and Thomas, 2002) . Cooked earnings in China could easily misallocate resources since IPO pricing was determined by a regulated price/earnings (PE) ratio before year 2009. 1 Previous literature (Aharony, Lee, and Wong, 2000, 2010; Kao, Wu, and Yang, 2009 ) finds evidence of earnings manipulation by issuers in China who used accruals to manage earnings prior to IPOs to obtain favorable IPO pricing. Based on a sample of 503 IPO issuers in China from 2002 to 2008, we find that underwriter reputations have significantly negative correlations with IPO earnings management if the issuer is an NSOE. However, no significant relationship is documented if the issuer is government affiliated (i.e., an SOE). Further tests also find that a prestigious underwriter can improve post-IPO performance, but only in the NSOE market.
Our study contributes to the existing literature along the following dimensions. First, the majority of existing research focuses on underwriter reputation regardless of institutional background. These studies consider the market as a whole, with the assumption that interaction between issuers and underwriters are cross-sectionally homogeneous. Our study addresses this issue by studying a single market while analyzing differences in market segments based on ownership background. We find that underwriter reputation works well in alleviating issuers' pre-IPO earnings management and improves postissue performance in NSOE market segments only, rather than in the whole market. Additionally, our evidence supplements the literature regarding mechanisms for improving information quality in the transitional market. We study the correlation between underwriter reputation, pre-IPO earnings management, and post-IPO returns in China. Our results indicate that the underwriter's role in reducing earnings management and improving postissue returns is conditional upon the issuer's ownership background.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the related literature and develops the hypothesis. Section II presents our data sources and measurements of key variables and descriptive statistics. Our research design and main regression results are discussed in Section III, while our robustness checks are conducted in Section IV. The role of the underwriter's reputation on post-IPO performance is explored in Section V. Section VI provides our conclusions.
I. Related Literature and Hypothesis

A. Earnings Management and Underwriter Reputation during IPOs
Public information about the issuer is limited during an IPO, which constrains the investors' abilities to evaluate the issuer's prior performance. Therefore, the accounting information in the prospectus is of great significance. Underwriters set IPO offer prices based on the issuer's current earnings and industrial PE ratios. Alternatively, investors rely on reported earnings to make their investment decisions. Therefore, issuers should bear considerable discretion in releasing good news to provide a vision of firm's future (Ho, Huang, Lin, and Lin, 2010) and manipulating earnings prior to IPOs. However, the accounting accrual may be reversed later leading to poor post-IPO performance. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998b) find evidence supporting this conjecture. Specifically, they document that issuers use positive accruals to report favorable pre-IPO earnings and that issuers with aggressive earnings management experience decline in long-term stock returns and earnings performance. DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefeik (2004) report similar results, where some firms opportunistically manipulate earnings upward prior to stock issues. Darrough and Rangan (2005) note a positive correlation between discretionary accruals in IPO years and managerial selling, providing evidence of managers' opportunistic motivation in earnings manipulation during the IPO process. Several studies (Aharony, Lee, and Wong, 2000, 2010; Kao, Wu, and Zhang, 2009 ) also document overall evidence of IPO earnings management by issuers in China.
To alleviate information asymmetry in the IPO process, third party certifiers, such as auditors, underwriters, and attorneys, are required to assist in the IPO process. Michaely and Shaw (1994) determine that IPOs underwritten by reputable investment banks are less likely to be underpriced and tend to perform better in the long run. Brau and Fawcett's (2006) survey of chief financial officers indicates that hiring a top investment bank to underwrite an IPO is a positive signal. Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2010) find evidence that underwriters are able to differentiate the quality of issuers and reflect the information in the underwriting spread and initial returns. Titman and Trueman (1986) provide theoretical support for the relationship between underwriter quality and IPO pricing. In particular, they find that an issuer with favorable information about its firm value is more likely to choose a high-quality underwriter than an issuer with less favorable information. In other words, issuers that are confident about their accounting information are more likely to hire reputable underwriters, providing a signal to the market. As a result, underwriter reputation is negatively associated with earnings management. Following Brau and Johnson (2009) , we call this the signaling hypothesis.
Other researchers have an alternative explanation for the negative correlation between underwriter reputation and earnings management; namely, that reputable underwriters mitigate issuers' earnings management behavior to protect their reputation. Prior studies (Dunbar, 2000; Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008) find that prestigious underwriters keep their valuable reputations through maintaining high underwriting quality. During an IPO, aside from pricing the new issue, an underwriter provides such non-pricing services as analyst coverage and industry expertise (Liu and Ritter, 2011) including the important function of certifying the issuer's earnings quality (Lee and Masulis, 2011) . Underwriters are, therefore, motivated to mitigate issuer earnings management to protect their reputation. Following Brau and Johnson (2009) , we call this the mitigating hypothesis. Jo, Kim, and Park (2007) study a related issue in the seasoned equity offering market and find an inverse association between underwriter quality and issuer earnings management. They justify the negative correlation with reputable underwriters restricting firm incentives to manage earnings to protect their reputation and avoid litigation risk. Chang, Shi, Tam, and Wang (2010) believe that reputable underwriters mitigate information asymmetry in IPO pricing. Fang (2005) studies the bond offering market and documents that banks' underwriting decisions in corporate bond offerings reflect their reputational concerns.
Consequently, both hypotheses, the signaling and the mitigating hypothesis, predict a negative association between underwriter reputation and issuer pre-IPO earnings management. The explanation can be summarized as follows: 1) firms with high earnings quality are likely to hire reputable underwriters for signaling purposes, 2) reputable underwriters are motivated to reduce pre-IPO earnings management to protect their reputations, and 3) these two have a joint effect as reputable underwriters and issuers with high earnings quality tend to choose each other.
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B. Ownership Effect
Based on the above argument, we expect a negative relationship between underwriter reputation and pre-IPO earnings management. However, as discussed in the introductory section, evidence documented in developed markets where private agents dominate may not be equally applicable to transitional markets, such as China, due to the issuers' different ownership backgrounds. Previous literature has studied various differences in SOEs and NSOEs during the IPO process. Kornai (1993) and Qian (1994) find that government leaders have an incentive to help SOEs in IPOs as successful SOE IPOs bring more resources into the government adding to the government leaders' political capital and increasing their chances for promotion (Li and Zhou, 2005) . Given the difference between SOE and NSOE issuers, our study focuses on the effect of ownership background on issuers' incentives to signal earnings quality and underwriters' incentives to mitigate issuers' earnings management.
Demand for accounting information during the IPO process is derived from two main groups in China: 1) the investors and 2) the CSRC. Before a public offering, the investors have very little information about the issuer. Therefore, the prospectus is the most important information source available to public investors. Armed with only that information, investors usually adversely select low quality issuers. To reduce adverse selection, issuers tend to provide high-quality information in their prospectus and hire reputable underwriters to signal their earnings quality. However, we note that the level of adverse selection is different for SOEs and NSOEs for the following reasons. First, given their relationship with the government, SOEs are more likely to receive its help or support than NSOEs. Government support includes not only governmental subsidies under existing regulations, but also monopoly advantages through shareholder influence on the proposed regulations. Furthermore, in case of financial distress, government-owned firms are more likely to avoid liquidation or bankruptcy, thanks to government bailouts, than firms with no government ownership. Therefore, we argue that SOEs face less risk of public investor adverse selection than NSOEs. Consequently, when compared with NSOEs, SOE issuers are associated with lower incentives to hire reputable underwriters to signal their earnings quality. Moreover, SOE and NSOE issuers also face different levels of adverse selection by the CSRC. Like the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the CSRC imposes a set of minimum disclosure requirements and investigates issuers to determine whether they have met these before allowing them to go public. In addition to regulatory compliance, one of the most important aspects of the investigation is financial reporting quality. Thus, issuers are likely to be adversely selected by the CSRC for poor reporting quality. However, due to their close relationship with the government, SOE issuers are associated with a lower risk of adverse selection by the CSRC. 3 In addition, one of the CSRC's missions is to assist government-supported firms in receiving access to sufficient funds for further development. Given the CSRC's critical role in determining the outcome of an IPO (see Appendix A, Steps 6, 10, and 12), government-owned issuers are more likely to successfully initiate IPOs and 2 Brau and Johnson (2009) attempt to differentiate the two effects using a simultaneous model. They find that the negative relation between underwriter reputation and pre-IPO earnings management is mainly driven by the signaling effect in the US market. Section IV.B follows their approach. 3 Supporting our argument that SOEs are associated with less adverse selection bias than NSOEs, Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008) study how specific institutional features in China affect the decision making of Chinese listed firms' auditors and find that SOEs are more likely to hire small auditors than NSOEs. The authors argue that the results can be explained by the SOEs' low demand for large auditors, government bailouts, or collusion incentives. be approved than issuers without government ownership, regardless of their accounting quality. 4 Consequently, SOE issuers are less motivated to hire prestigious underwriters than NSOEs to signal earnings quality.
In contrast, NSOE issuers face a greater risk of adverse selection by public investors and the CSRC. To mitigate adverse selection, they are more likely to hire reputable underwriters to signal their earnings quality. Therefore, with the signaling hypothesis, we predict a negative relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management for NSOE issuers. The negative correlation is attenuated for SOE issuers.
With respect to the mitigating hypothesis, we again base our argument on different issuers. As argued above, NSOE issuers face higher levels of adverse selection as investors and the CSRC more concerned about the accounting information of NSOEs than that of SOEs. An underwriter of an NSOE issuer, either to establish, maintain, or enhance its reputation, is likely to certify earnings quality by monitoring earnings management behavior since investors and the CSRC can identify the underwriters of issuers of high earnings quality (and, as a result, superior long-term performance) for future underwriting tasks, which is beneficial for future business. However, the argument may not be equally applicable to SOE issuers. Due to their lower level of adverse selection, SOE issuers' accounting information is relatively less important for investors to evaluate and for the CSRC to approve an IPO application. As a result, underwriters of SOE issuers have fewer legal liabilities, as well as less incentive to exert efforts in mitigating pre-IPO earnings management. In this case, underwriters tend to be motivated to mitigate earnings manipulation only when the issuer is an NSOE.
By the inferences from both the signaling and mitigating arguments, we hypothesize that underwriter reputation is negatively associated with earnings management for NSOE issuers. However, for SOE issuers, the negative relationship is not obvious and, as such, subject to empirical evidence.
II. Data and Variables
This section explains the sample and data sources. Then, we describe the measures of the key variables used in this study.
A. Sample and Data Sources
Our sample consists of all the IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2002 to 2008. Our sample starts in 2002 because the CSRC issued a new regulation in March 2001 (see Appendix B for a detailed description of IPO reforms) that shifted the rights of proposing potential issuers from the government to underwriters, thus requiring that lead underwriters provide advice to issuers with respect to corporate restructuring. In May 2009, the CSRC issued another regulation requiring IPO pricing to be based on book building rather than regulated PE ratios. To obtain a clear sample that excludes the effect of significant regulatory changes, we restrict our latest sample observations to the year 2008. The relevant data are extracted from the Wind database. Specifically, this database provides data on the year of the IPO, its underwriters, the issuing amounts, and pre-IPO financial data. After deleting observations with missing values, we obtain a final sample of 503 issuers from 2002 to 2008.
B. Measure of Underwriter Reputation
Previous studies measure underwriter reputation based on either: 1) underwriter ranking in the IPO tombstone (Carter and Manaster, 1990) or 2) the underwriter's market share (Megginson and Weiss 1991) , where a larger market share indicates a higher underwriter reputation. Since neither IPO tombstones nor data on underwriter rankings from authoritative organizations are available in China, we estimate underwriter reputation based on the second measure, the underwriter's market share. An underwriter's market share is calculated as the percentage of the total amount the issuer's investment bank j underwrote the year prior to the IPO. That is, i UWAMT i,j / i UWAMT i , where UWAMT i,j is the amount of firm i underwritten by investment bank j. If a single issuer is underwritten by more than one investment bank, the average underwriting amount is used for each investment bank.
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This study investigates the impact of underwriter reputation on issuers with different ownership backgrounds. As discussed in Section II, government ownership alters the motivation of issuers to signal earnings quality and underwriters to mitigate earnings management. As a response, underwriters may adopt different strategies when choosing potential clients. As observed in the first row of Panel A, Table I , the top five underwriters in terms of pre-IPO market share during our sample period are CITIC Security, China International Capital Corporation (CICC), China Galaxy, BOC International, and Cinda Security, respectively, which also ranked in the top five in the SOE market. However, these underwriters rarely ranked in the top five within the non-SOE market in our sample period. For example, CITIC Security ranks first in the SOE market, but is not an important player in the NSOE market. Panel B of Table I provides further evidence of different strategies adopted by underwriters in developing their clients. A significantly negative correlation between underwriter market share in SOE and NSOE issuers is found suggesting that underwriters targeting the SOE IPO market do not focus on the NSOE IPO market and vice versa.
Chen and Xu (2011) empirically investigate underwriters' different strategies of obtaining market shares in different markets and find that they rely on government ownership to expand market shares in the SOE IPO market, while industry specialization is more important in attracting issuers in the NSOE market. Therefore, it is improper to use market shares in the whole market to proxy for the reputation of underwriters with different strategies. Thus, we calculate market shares separately in the different market segments. The distributions of underwriters' market shares in each market are reported in Panel C of Table I . We note that the average market share in different market segments is around 3%. In addition, none of the median values of the market shares in the three markets are economically significant (i.e., more than 0.5%). This is especially true in the NSOE market, where the median value is zero indicating that half of the underwriters in the NSOE market did not underwrite any IPO tasks the previous year. To effectively capture the effect of underwriter reputation, we define the dummy variable, UWREP, as equal to one if the underwriters' market share in a specific market the year prior to an IPO ranks in the top 25%, and zero otherwise.
C. Measure of Earnings Management
Reported earnings consist of cash flow from operations and accruals resulting from accrual basis accounting. While managers exert limited discretion in managing cash flows, they manipulate earnings through accruals. Accruals can be divided into discretionary and non-discretionary
Table I. Underwriting Markets Separated by Issuer Ownership
The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. All A-share IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are included with N = 503. An underwriter's market share is measured as the percentage of the amount underwritten with respect to the total underwriting amount of the whole market or of each segment market one year prior to the IPO year. An issuer is identified as an SOE if its ultimate shareholder is the government; otherwise, it is identified as an NSOE. Panel A lists the top five underwriters in terms of market share in the whole, SOE, and NSOE markets, respectively. Panel B reports the pairwise correlation of underwriter market shares in the whole, SOE, and NSOE markets. Panel C describes the distribution of underwriter market shares. accruals. Consistent with prior research (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Jo, Kim, and Park, 2007) , we use discretionary accruals to measure earnings management.
Panel A. Top Five Underwriters by Market Segment
6 Since non-discretionary accruals are determined by a firm's economic fundamentals, managers typically do little to manipulate them. Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2001) indicate that the cross-sectionally modified Jones model is superior to the time series Jones model in detecting earnings management. Therefore, we use a cross-sectionally modified Jones model to measure discretionary accruals. Following Hribar and 6 Some studies (Chen and Yuan, 2004) use nonoperating income to measure earnings management. However, as indicated by Chen and Yuan (2004) , Chinese regulators may scrutinize firms that use nonoperating income. In addition, their ability to do so has improved over time. Therefore, it is likely that excess nonoperating income will be particularly examined by the CSRC and will then be corrected during the IPO process. When compared to nonoperating income, discretionary accruals are relatively difficult for regulators to detect. Thus, we use discretionary accruals, rather than nonoperating income, to measure earnings management. Section IV employs alternative measures to proxy for earnings management and the results remain unchanged.
Collins (2002), we calculate total accruals (TAC) using a cash flow statement approach: 7 TAC = Net income − Cash flow from operations.
(1)
To calculate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model, we take the residual term from estimating the cross-sectional regression:
where PPE is property, plant, and equipment, REV is the change in sales, and AR is the change in accounts receivable. All the variables are deflated by the beginning balance of the year's total assets. The explanatory variable PPE is included as the greater the investment in PPE, the more depreciation charged resulting in negative accruals. REV -AR is included to control for sales on credit, which is another major determinant of accrual. Equation (2) is estimated by first excluding all IPO firms in year t, and then it is regressed by industry year. Any industry with fewer than eight observations is removed. We obtain the estimates of β 0 , β 1 , and β 2 after running the regression on Equation (2). The terms β 0 , β 1 , and β 2 are then used as firm-specific parameters to estimate the non-discretionary accruals of each IPO firm. The residual term (ε) is the discretionary accrual (DAC) for each individual IPO firm that is used as the measure of earnings management.
D. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table II presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. To mitigate the concern that the results may be driven by extreme values, we winsorize all financial reporting data at 1%. We observe that for issuers from 2002 to 2008, the mean and median values of our dependent variable, discretionary accruals (DAC), are 0.088 and 0.080, respectively. A mean (median) value of 0.151 (0.140) is reported for the pre-IPO operating cash flows deflated by total assets (CFO). The pre-IPO mean (median) return on assets (ROA) is 0.151 (0.138) and the mean value of total assets (ASSETS) for issuers in their pre-IPO year is RMB 44.40 billion, while the median value of ASSETS is RMB 0.484 billion. The right-skewed distribution is caused by a maximum value of RMB 6.457 trillion (not reported here). The total issuing amount (ISSAMT) has a mean (median) value of RMB 1.623 (0.307) billion. A mean of 8.5% of our sample is audited by a Big Four auditor (AUDITOR).
8 Three variables, STATESH, MGMTSH, and LARGESH, are used to identify the issuer's ownership structure. Specifically, STATESH is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is ultimately controlled by the government, and zero otherwise; MGMTSH is equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise; and LARGESH measures the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. About half (49.4%) of our sample firms are SOEs. An average of 5.8% of our sample firms has top management ownership. The mean value of LARGESH is 0.430 suggesting that the largest shareholder holds 43% of the shares, on average. The variable GSALES, which measures the percentage change in sales from
Table II. Descriptive Statistics
The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. All A-share IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are included with a total of 503 observations. The variable DAC is total discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model; CFO is operating cash flow divided by total assets in the year before the IPO; ROA is the return on total assets in the year before the IPO; ASSETS is total assets at year-end before the IPO in RMB billion; ISSAMT is the total issuing amount of an issuer measured in RMB billion; AUDITOR is a dummy variable that is equal to one if an issuer is audited by a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise; STATESH is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer's ultimate controller is the government, and zero otherwise; MGMTSH is a dummy variable equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise; LARGESH is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder; GSALES is the percentage change in sales; and PB is the market-to-book ratio at the end of the IPO year. All financial reporting data are winsorized at 1%. An issuer is identified as an SOE if its ultimate shareholder is the government; otherwise, it is identified as an NSOE. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for all of the variables. Panel B presents the means of all of the variables by year. Panel C compares SOE and NSOE issuers. Panel D divides the sample into deciles based on the value of DAC. An underwriter is classified as reputable if its market share on the SOE or NSOE market in the year prior to the IPO is ranked among the top 25%. year t -1 to year t, has a mean of 1.267, and PB, which is the market-to-book ratio at the end of the IPO year, exhibits a mean of 3.869. All of the variables except ASSETS exhibit normal values of the standard deviation indicating that our sample is not skewed. Our sample distribution by year is reported in Panel B of Table II provides more insight into the distribution of earnings management. Issuers are divided into deciles based on DAC, and the second row reports the percentage of SOE issuers in each decile. Although the lowest DAC decile is comprise of two-thirds SOEs, the highest DAC decile still consists of one-third SOE issuers. This distribution suggests that earnings management is also important to SOEs. 10 The third and fourth rows of Panel D of Table II report the percentages of issuers underwritten by reputable underwriters in each decile for the SOE and NSOE markets, respectively. While no clear pattern is observed for the SOE market (third row), the following is found for the NSOE market. First, the percentage of issuers underwritten by reputable underwriters in the lowest DAC decile is relatively high (0.412), which is consistent with the signaling hypothesis that issuers are likely to hire a reputable underwriter to signal high earnings quality. In addition, the percentage of issuers underwritten by reputable underwriters is highest in the sixth decile, which may be the result of the mitigating effect where most reputable underwriters monitor their clients' earnings management behavior at an acceptable level that is just above the median. Table III reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in this study. The upper part of Table III reports the correlations between the control variables. These correlation coefficients are generally within a normal range suggesting that our variables are free of multicollinearity problems. Moreover, to further ensure that our empirical model is not significantly affected by multicollinearity problems, we check the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of our regression. Our test indicates that the VIFs of all the independent variables are less than 3.1. The lower part of Table III presents the correlations between underwriter reputation in the different market segments and the control variables. Here UWREP_WM, UWREP_SOE, and UWREP_NSOE represent underwriter reputation in the whole IPO market, the SOE IPO market, and the NSOE IPO market, respectively. We note that the correlations between UWREP_SOE and the control variables and between UWREP_NSOE and the control variables are generally opposite indicating the significant differences between the roles of underwriter reputation in the SOE and NSOE IPO markets. This finding supports our argument that investment banks may adopt different strategies in different market segments.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
III. Model Specification and Empirical Results
A. Model Specification
This section employs multivariate analysis to empirically test our hypothesis. We seek to answer the research question of whether reputable underwriters can effectively mitigate earnings 10 This is intuitive since IPO prices are set through a regulated PE ratio with an upper bound during our sample period. Both SOEs and NSOEs have incentives to manage earnings to raise a maximum amount of equity capital. For example, before the China Railway Group went public in 2007, it wrote off its over accrued employee benefits. As a result, its pre-IPO earnings increased by RMB 1.173 billion. In comparison, the net income reported in the prospectus was RMB 1.544 billion. The focus of our paper, however, is not the type of firm, SOE or NSOE, associated with higher earnings management but, the different incentives of the issuers and their underwriters.
Table III. Pearson Correlations of Independent Variables
The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. All A-share IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are included with a total number of 503 observations. The variable AUDITOR is a dummy variable equal to one if an issuer is audited by a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise; CFO is operating cash flow divided by total assets in the year before the IPO; LNISSAMT is the natural log of an issuer's total issuing amount, measured in RMB billion; STATESH is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer's ultimate controller is the government, and zero otherwise; MGMTSH is a dummy variable equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise; LARGESH is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder; GSALES is the percentage change in sales; and PB is the market-to-book ratio at the end of the IPO year. All financial reporting data are winsorized at 1%. The variables UWREP SOE and UWREP NSOE are dummies that are equal to one if the ranking of the underwriter's market share on the SOE or NSOE market, respectively, in the year prior to the IPO is among the top 25%, and zero otherwise. manipulation in different market segments. As discussed in Section I, issuers signal earnings quality by hiring prestigious underwriters and/or underwriters mitigate pre-IPO earnings management to protect their reputations. The correlation between underwriter reputation and issuer earnings management may suffer from an endogeneity problem as the choice of reputable underwriters may not be an exogenous event. To address this issue, we employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. Specifically, in the first stage, we estimate a probit underwriter choice model in which the ex ante likelihood of choosing a prestigious underwriter, denoted by UWREP, is regressed on a set of variables that are deemed to affect the choice of a reputable underwriter:
where UWREP is a dummy variable that equals one if the market share of a specific underwriter in the year prior to the IPO is in the upper 25% of the sample, and zero otherwise. Here UW_GOV is employed as the instrumental variable, it being a dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter is ultimately owned by the government, and zero otherwise. Government ownership of underwriters is relevant to underwriters' strategies in choosing clients and to clients' choices of underwriters (Chen and Xu, 2011) . We argue that UW_GOV is a good candidate for the instrumental variable since the ownership structure of underwriters is largely exogenous and can affect the decision to choose a particular underwriter, which in turn affects UWREP.
In the second stage, we empirically test the association between issuer pre-IPO earnings management and underwriter reputation. To do so, we estimate the following regression using the predicted value of Equation (3) to proxy for underwriter reputation and linking that with DAC:
We also include a set of control variables deemed to influence pre-IPO earnings management, industry, and year fixed effects. In this equation, DAC is a proxy for earnings management, as estimated by the modified Jones model specified in Equation (2). A negative coefficient for UWREP_hat is consistent with the argument that prestigious underwriters alleviate earnings management. According to our hypothesis, we expect a more negative coefficient for UWREP_hat for NSOE issuers than for SOE issuers.
Other variables are included in the regression to control for issuer-specific factors that may affect an issuer's pre-IPO earnings management behavior. First, high-quality auditors are expected to detect and mitigate earnings management. Thus, we include a dummy variable that is equal to one if the issuer is audited by a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise (AUDITOR). However, auditors' roles in China are often questioned because of government relationships and institutional features (Wang, Wong, and Xia, 2008) , especially given the leading role played by underwriters (see Appendix A). Therefore, we expect that when compared with the role of underwriters, auditors, in reducing earnings management during the IPO process in China, have only a secondorder effect. Additionally, CFO, operating cash flow deflated by total assets in the year prior to the IPO, is used to control for real performance in terms of cash flow. We predict that firms with higher levels of cash performance are less likely to use accruals to improve book earnings (i.e., a negative association exists between DAC and CFO). Moreover, LNISSAM, the natural logarithm of an issuer's total issuing amount, is employed to control for issuance size. In addition, two variables are included to control for an issuer's governance structure: 1) MGMTSH is equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise, and 2) LARGESH measures the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. Also, since high growth firms naturally have greater accruals, we include two more variables to control for an issuer's growth potential: 1) GSALES, calculated as the percentage change in sales from year t -1 to year t, and 2) PB, the market-to-book ratio. Finally, industry and year dummies are included to control for industry and year fixed effects. The same set of control variables as mentioned earlier, AUDITOR, CFO, LNISSAMT, MGMTSH, LARGESH, GSALES, PB, and industry and year fixed effects, is also included in the first-stage probit model.
B. Regression Results
We estimate Equations (3) and (4) for SOE and NSOE issuers, respectively. The results for the 2SLS approach are reported in Table IV. All t-statistics are corrected for IPO-year clustering.
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Section A (B) describes the results for the SOE (NSOE) subsample, while Column 1 (2) reports the results of the first (second) stage. We find that in the first-step regression, the coefficient of UW_GOV is significantly related to UWREP, with a negative sign for the NSOE market indicating that NSOE issuers are less likely to be underwritten by government-related investment banks. According to Chen and Xu (2011) , the negative relationship is driven by underwriter strategy. Government-owned underwriters take on SOEs as their main target clients and throw less effort
Table IV. 2SLS Regressions on Earnings Management
The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. All A-share IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are included with 503 total observations. In the first stage, the following probit model is estimated:
In the second stage, the following equation is estimated:
where DAC is total discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model and UWREP_SOE and UWREP_NSOE are dummies equal to one if the ranking of the underwriter's market share on the SOE or NSOE market, respectively, in the year prior to the IPO is among the top 25%, and zero otherwise. The predicted values of these variables in the first stage are used in the second stage regression. The variable UW_GOV is equal to one if the underwriter is owned by the government, and zero otherwise; AUDITOR is a dummy variable equal to one if an issuer is audited by a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise; CFO is operating cash flow divided by total assets in the year before the IPO; LNISSAMT is the natural log of the issuer's total issuing amount, measured in RMB billion; MGMTSH is a dummy variable equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise; LARGESH is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder; GSALES is the percentage change in sales; and PB is the market-to-book ratio at the end of the IPO year. All financial reporting data are winsorized at 1%. All of the t-values are corrected for IPO-year clustering and are presented in parentheses. into their NSOE clients. Consequently, reputable underwriters are less likely to exist in the NSOE market.
With respect to the results of the second-step regression, the coefficient of UWREP for the NSOE issuer subsample (Column 4) is significantly negative (-0.132 with a t-value of -3.820) suggesting that underwriter reputation can effectively reduce pre-IPO earnings manipulation if the issuer is an NSOE issuer. In contrast, the estimate of UWREP for the SOE issuer subsample (Column 2) is not significantly different from zero. As argued in Section I, these results can be attributed to either: 1) SOE issuers having fewer incentives than NSOE issuers to signal earnings quality or 2) the underwriters of NSOE issuers are more motivated to mitigate earnings management than those of SOE issuers since NSOE issuers face higher levels of adverse selection by public investors and/or the CSRC.
The following results from the second stage are noteworthy regarding the control variables. The variable CFO is negatively associated with earnings management at less than the 10% level in all model specifications, which is consistent with our prediction and prior studies (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) . LNISSAMT is significantly positive if the issuer is in the NSOE market segment, confirming a positive correlation between financing amounts and pre-IPO earnings management. The coefficient of GSALES (PB) is significantly positive in the SOE (NSOE) market segment indicating that issuers with greater growth potential are associated with higher discretionary accruals. The sign on AUDITOR is negative, but not significant confirming the concern over the auditor's role in mitigating pre-IPO earnings manipulation. Finally, with respect to the relationship between the issuer's governance structure and earnings management, we find that the coefficient of MGMTSH is significantly negative in the NSOE sample, while that of LARGESH is not significant in either the SOE or NSOE sample. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) raise concerns over the use of the Jones model to measure earnings management in the IPO setting, as Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998b) did. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue that the application of the Jones model in Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998b) may be biased in the IPO setting due to the use of: 1) balance sheet data to calculate total accruals, 2) DAC in the IPO year to measure pre-IPO earnings management, and 3) variables deflated by pre-IPO total assets in the IPO year. However, our study is less likely to suffer from these concerns due to the following. First, instead of the balance sheet approach, we use the cash flow statement approach to calculate total accruals following Hribar and Collins (2002) . Additionally, since our focus is on pre-IPO earnings management, total accruals calculated by Equation (1) are accruals in the year prior to the IPO rather than in the IPO year. Therefore, the estimation of total accruals does not involve the use of data from the post-IPO period. As a result, deflating total accruals by pre-IPO total assets does not suffer from the problems raised by Ball and Shivakumar (2008) .
IV. Robustness
A. Alternative Measures of Discretionary Accruals
This section examines the robustness of our results to alternative measures of discretionary accruals. Specifically, we follow the approach of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) that emphasizes the role of accruals in the timely recognition of gains and losses. 12 The intuition is that this role increases the volatility of accruals, and volatile accruals can be viewed as having low earnings quality in the modified Jones model. Furthermore, since accounting recognition is conditionally conservative in that losses are recognized in a timelier manner than gains (Basu, 1997) , the relationship between proxies for economic gains and losses and accruals is nonlinear. However, Guary (2006) points out that the recognition of gains is as important as that of losses from the perspective of either the cost of accounting accruals or the contract. As a result, conservatism is not a concern in estimating discretionary accruals. To determine whether our results are robust to alternative measures of discretionary accruals, we adopt the model of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) , both with and without conditional conservatism concerns, to estimate discretionary accruals. Following Ball and Shivakumar (2006) , we use industry median-adjusted operating cash flow to measure economic gains and losses. When the conditional conservatism concern is included in the model, the following piecewise linear regression is estimated:
where TAC is the total accruals as calculated in Equation (1); REV is the change in sales; PPE is plant, property, and equipment; ADJCFO is the industry median-adjusted operating cash flow; and DADJCFO is a dummy variable equal to one if ADJCFO is negative, and zero otherwise. All of the variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. As in the main test, the year of interest here is one year prior to the IPO event. Therefore, deflating the variables by total assets at the beginning of year does not lead to the concern raised by Ball and Shivakumar (2008) . Next, we estimate discretionary accruals without considering conservatism concerns. The correlation between discretionary accruals and the proxies for gains or losses becomes linear and Equation (5) can be rewritten as:
The discretionary accruals, DAC, with and without concerns of conservatism, are estimated as the residual terms of Equations (5) and (6), respectively. We then re-estimate Equation (3) using these two alternative measures of discretionary accruals. The results are reported in Table V . Sections A and B of Table V report the results using DAC with and without conservatism concerns as the dependent variable, respectively. As demonstrated, the coefficient of UWREP in the SOE market is not significant in either Section A or B. In contrast, the coefficient of UWREP in the NSOE market is significantly negative for both sections. This finding is consistent with the main results reported in Table IV , although the results become less significant.
13 Therefore, our results are robust to alternative measures of discretionary accruals.
B. Signaling or Mitigation Hypothesis?
Up to now, our empirical results have suggested that underwriter reputation is negatively associated with earnings management for NSOE issuers. We argue that this negative association is driven by the signaling hypothesis, the mitigation hypothesis, or a joint effect of the two. Our
Table V. Second-Step Regressions on DAC with and without Conditional Conservatism Concerns
The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. All A-share IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are included. The total number of observations is 446. Section A presents the results when the dependent variable is DAC with conservatism concerns. Section B reports the results when the dependent variable is DAC without conservatism concerns. The DAC values with and without conservatism concerns are measured as the residual terms of the following regressions: with conditioned conservatism concerns:
and without conditioned conservatism concerns:
where TAC is total accruals; ADJCFO is the industry median-adjusted operating cash flow prior to the IPO; and DADJCFO is a dummy variable equal to one if ADJCFO is negative, and zero otherwise. All the above variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. The independent variables include UWREP_SOE and UWREP_NSOE, which equal one if the ranking of the underwriter's market share in the SOE or NSOE market, respectively, in the year prior to the IPO is among the top 25%, and zero otherwise; AUDITOR, a dummy variable equal to one if an issuer is audited by a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise; CFO, operating cash flow divided by total assets in the year before the IPO; LNISSAMT, the natural log of an issuer's total issuing amount, measured in RMB billion; MGMTSH, a dummy variable equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise; LARGESH, the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder; GSALES, the percentage change in sales; and PB, the market-to-book ratio at the end of the IPO year. All financial reporting data are winsorized at 1%. The t-values are presented in parentheses. main test does not explicitly differentiate between the two effects for the following two reasons. First, the incentives of issuers that choose reputable underwriters and reputable underwriters that certify earnings management are unobservable. Without a direct empirical proxy for these incentives, we avoid drawing a quick conclusion regarding which hypothesis dominates. Moreover, both hypotheses lead to the same conclusion. Therefore, it is difficult to differentiate between them given the existing evidence. This section attempts to determine which effect dominates in determining the negative correlation between DAC and UWREP using the approach suggested by Brau and Johnson (2009) . These authors examine the causality of earnings management and the performance of financial intermediaries using simultaneous regression models. Specifically, we differentiate between the two hypotheses with the following two simultaneous models: 1) the mitigation hypothesis model:
2nd step :
and 2) the signaling hypothesis model:
2nd step:
Our main test follows a 2SLS approach, whereas in the first stage [Equation (3)], a probit underwriter choice model is estimated and UW_GOV is employed as the instrumental variable. In the second stage [Equation (4)], the predicted value of UWREP from the first stage is applied as the test variable. Thus, our main test is substantially the same as the mitigation hypothesis model [Equations (7) and (8)]. To differentiate between the signaling and mitigation hypotheses, we continue to test the signaling hypothesis model [Equations (9) and (10)]. Specifically, in the first-step regression with discretionary accruals as the dependent variable, we use operating cash flow (CFO) and growth of sales (GSALES) as the instrumental variables. The variable CFO and the accounting accruals are both indicators of gains and losses. As such, DAC is influenced by CFO. In addition, firms with higher sales growth are usually associated with higher accruals, especially IPO firms (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008) . Alternatively, there is no compelling argument that the choice of reputable underwriters is affected by CFO or GSALES. The predicted value of DAC from Equation (9) is then included as an independent variable in Equation (10).
The results of the second step are reported in Table VI , with Sections A and B presenting the results for the SOE and NSOE markets, respectively.
14 The coefficients of the predicted value of DAC (DAC_hat) are insignificant in both the SOE and NSOE markets, providing no evidence for the signaling hypothesis. Together, with the main results provided in Table IV , we find that the negative relationship between DAC and UWREP is largely driven by the mitigation hypothesis instead of the signaling hypothesis. However, since the two hypotheses are difficult to differentiate between, by nature, we acknowledge that this conclusion is drawn conditionally upon the appropriateness of a simultaneous regression model when addressing the issue. Our findings are different from that of Brau and Johnson (2009) , who support the signaling hypothesis using US data. This may be due to either: 1) increasing legal liabilities imposed on underwriters, as
Table VI. 2SLS with the Signaling Hypothesis Model
The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. All A-share IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are included. The total number of observations is 503. Section A reports the results for the SOE market and Section B reports the results for the NSOE market. In the first step, the following model is estimated:
In the second step, the following probit model is estimated:
DAC is the total discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model; Instrument includes CFO and GSALES; and UWREP is either UWREP_SOE or UWREP_NSOE, where UWREP_SOE and UWREP_NSOE are dummies that are equal one if the ranking of the underwriter's market share on the SOE or NSOE market, respectively, in the year prior to the IPO is among the top 25%e, and zero otherwise. The predicted value of DAC from the first step is used in the second step regression. The variable UW_GOV is equal to one if the underwriter is owned by the government, and zero otherwise; AUDITOR is a dummy variable equal to one if an issuer is audited by a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise; CFO is operating cash flow divided by total assets in the year before the IPO; LNISSAMT is the natural log of the issuer's total issuing amount, measured in RMB billion; MGMTSH is a dummy variable equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise; LARGESH is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder; GSALES is the percentage change in sales; and PB is the market-to-book ratio at the end of the IPO year. All financial reporting data are winsorized at 1%. discussed in introductory section, and/or 2) the relatively weak incentives of issuers to signal their reporting quality due to the strong demand for stocks from equity market investors.
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C. Alternative Proxies of Underwriter Reputation
In our main test, underwriter reputation is proxied by a dummy variable that is based on the pre-IPO market share in each market segment, where market share is measured by the percentage of the total underwriting amount. To determine whether our results are driven by the approach in which we measure underwriter reputation, we re-calculate the market share of an investment bank using alternative proxies. First, instead of the dummy variable UWREP, we use the continuous value of market share to measure underwriter reputation. In addition, we calculate the market share based on the number (instead of the underwriting amount) of clients underwritten by a particular investment bank in the year prior to the IPO. Furthermore, we employ the three-yearahead cumulative market share to proxy for underwriter reputation. Equation (4) is re-estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with three alternative measures of underwriter reputation, and the results are reported in Table VII . Consistent with the findings documented in the previous tables, the coefficient of UWREP using the first two measures is significantly negative in the NSOE market, while no significant coefficient is found in the SOE market. The coefficient of UWREP using the three-year-ahead cumulative market share demonstrates an expected, but insignificant negative sign, possibly since the three-year cumulative market share negates the most recent underwriter growth and performance. In short, Table VII reports that our results are generally robust to different measures of underwriter reputation.
D. Cross-Market Test
A competing interpretation of our results argues that the negative correlation in the NSOE market and the insignificant relation in the SOE market may simply be the result of the competitive advantages in monitoring the earnings quality of reputable underwriters in the NSOE market. To address this competing hypothesis, we conduct a cross-market test to determine whether reputable underwriters in the NSOE market are still effective in mitigating earnings management in the SOE market. For example, if a prestigious investment bank in the NSOE market underwrites an SOE issuer, will it still be able to detect and mitigate earnings management as it does for an NSOE issuer? Equation (4) is then re-estimated on a cross-market basis using the OLS approach. If government ownership moderates the signaling function of issuers and/or the mitigating function of underwriters, as we discussed, we do not expect reputable underwriters in the NSOE market to effectively reduce earnings management behavior in the SOE market.
The results of our cross-market test are presented in Table VIII . The coefficient of UWREP_NSOE is not significant at the conventional level for the SOE market, implying that a reputable underwriter in the NSOE market is no longer effective if it underwrites an SOE issuer. Meanwhile, reputable underwriters in the SOE market do not work effectively in the NSOE market either. We interpret our results as signifying that underwriters in the SOE market, with SOE issuers as their major clients, do not develop their ability when certifying the earnings quality of NSOE issuers. This result supports our argument that underwriters adopt different strategies in different market segments validating our approach to measure UWREP separately in each market segment.
In addition to the above robustness checks, we also conduct the following tests to determine whether our main results are sensitive to alternative econometric specification and alternative sampling. First, we estimate Equation (4) using the OLS approach with t-statistics corrected for IPO-year clustering and heteroskedasticity, respectively. Additionally, to eliminate the influences of different regulatory environments regarding underwriter behavior, we remove any observations cross-listed on other stock exchanges. Further, we delete any issuers that belong to the financial sector due to their different accounting treatment. Moreover, we delete all of the observations from 2005, which is a special year as the CSRC closed the IPO market for half of the year. As a result, only a relatively small number of issuers went public in 2005. To rule out any possible bias in the small sample when measuring earnings management and underwriter reputation, we delete these observations. While the results for the above robustness checks are not reported here for brevity, they are statistically similar to our main results. In short, the results presented in this section suggest that the main results presented in Table IV are robust to alternative measures of earnings management and underwriter reputation, different
Table VIII. Cross-Market Test
The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. All A-share IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are included. The total number of observations is 503. Section A reports the results for the SOE market, while Section B reports the results for the NSOE market. The dependent variable is DAC, total discretionary accruals, based on the modified Jones model. The variables UWREP_SOE and UWREP_NSOE are dummies that equal one if the ranking of the underwriter's market share on the SOE market or the NSOE market, respectively, in the prior year is among the top 25%, and zero otherwise; AUDITOR is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is audited by a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise; CFO is the operating cash flow divided by the total assets in the year before the IPO; LNISSAMT is the natural log of the issuer's total issuing amount, measured in RMB billion; MGMTSH is a dummy variable equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise; LARGESH is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder; GSALES is the percentage change in sales; and PB is the market-to-book ratio at the end of the IPO year. All financial reporting data are winsorized at 1%. econometric specifications, and alternative sampling. In addition, we rule out the possibility of alternative explanations.
V. Test of Underwriter Reputation on Post-IPO Performance
Until now, we obtained consistent evidence that a reputable underwriter can effectively restrain an issuer's pre-IPO earnings management behavior in the NSOE market. Prior studies provide evidence from the US IPO market regarding the effect of underwriter reputation on post-IPO performance (Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992; Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Carter, Dark, and Singh, 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2004 ) and the effect of earnings management on post-IPO performance (Teoh, Wong, and Rao, 1998a) . Jo, Kim, and Park (2007) examine US seasoned equity offerings and find a positive correlation between underwriter reputation and postissue performance after controlling for earnings quality. Following their study, we continue to investigate the effect of hiring a reputable underwriter on post-IPO performance in different market segments after controlling for earnings quality. First, we calculate monthly abnormal returns as a particular issuer's monthly return minus the monthly value-weighted market return. The 12-month postissue cumulative abnormal return (POSTCAR) is then calculated as the sum of the 12 consecutive monthly abnormal returns using the month immediately after the initial listing as the first month. Although these results are not reported here for brevity, we find that issuers experience an average (median) postissue 12-month cumulative abnormal return of -9.5% (-11.6%), which is consistent with the previous findings of the long-term underperformance of IPO firms (Ritter, 1991; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Gompers and Lerner, 2003) . A yearly analysis suggests that issuers experienced the lowest (highest) negative postissue returns in 2003 (2006) . Conducting a univariate comparison between SOE and NSOE issuers, we find that the SOE issuers experience more negative postissue returns than NSOE issuers, although the difference is not significant. Our multivariate analysis is based on the following model:
We include ROA, LNISSAMT, MGMTSH, and LARGESH as the control variables, defined in the same way as in Equation (4). Industry fixed effects are also included in the model. 16 We are interested in the sign of γ 1 , which captures the effect of underwriter reputation on postissue performance. Including both UWREP and DAC in the regression, we examine the mechanism of how reputable underwriters affect post-IPO performance. Specifically, we seek to determine whether reputable underwriters affect post-IPO performance through monitoring earnings management or through other marginal effects of their reputation. Since DAC is affected by UWREP, as documented in our previous analysis, we use the predicted value of the OLS model of Equation (4), DAC_PRED, in this regression.
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Panel A of Table IX portrays the univariate analysis of POSTCAR for issuers underwritten by different underwriters. It indicates that in the NSOE issuer market, issuers underwritten by prestigious underwriters obtain higher post-IPO returns than others. However, underwriter reputation does not lead to a significant difference in the POSTCAR values of the SOE market.
When Equation (11) is estimated by including UWREP only, as in Columns (1) and (4) in Panel B of Table IX , we find that the coefficient of UWREP is not significant in the SOE market. In contrast, it is significantly positive in the NSOE subsample providing support for our research question as to whether prestigious underwriters can improve postissue performance in different market segments. We interpret these results as the ability of reputable underwriters to effectively monitor earnings quality in the NSOE market resulting in higher post-IPO returns. We discover that DAC_PRED alone is significantly negative in both the SOE and NSOE markets suggesting that low earnings quality deteriorates post-IPO performance in both markets, as indicated in Columns (2) and (5) in Panel B of Table IX . Interestingly, when we include both UWREP and DAC_PRED in the regression [Columns (3) and (6)], we find that the coefficients of DAC_PRED in both markets remain significantly negative and that UWREP is significantly positive only in the NSOE market. This result suggests that the positive effect of underwriter reputation on post-IPO performance exists beyond enhancing the earnings quality in the NSOE market, while the effect of underwriter reputation is not as obvious in the SOE market. As for the control variables, we determine that the coefficient of financial performance (ROA) is significant and positive only
Table IX. Analyses of Post-IPO Performance
The sample period is from 2002 to 2008. All A-share IPO issuers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are included. The total number of observations is 503. The variable POSTCAR is the market-adjusted cumulative return 12 months after the month of the IPO; UWREP_SOE and UWREP_NSOE are dummies that are equal to one if the ranking of the underwriter's market share in the SOE or NSOE market, respectively, in the prior year is among the top 25%, and zero otherwise; DAC_PRED is the predicted value of the OLS regression in Table VI ; ROA is the return on assets; LNISSAMT is the natural log of the issuer's total issuing amount, measured in RMB billion; MGMTSH is a dummy variable equal to one if top management holds shares, and zero otherwise; and LARGESH is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. All financial reporting data are winsorized at 1%. in the NSOE market, while it is insignificant in the SOE market, which is consistent with our argument that investors emphasize operating performance less when evaluating an SOE issuer. Size (LNISSAMT) is significantly positive in the SOE market, but insignificant in the NSOE market indicating that the financing amount is no longer a determinant of the postissue returns of IPO firms without a government background. In short, this section examines the underwriter's role in postissue performance. Consistent with the argument that underwriter reputation is effective only in the NSOE market, we document a significantly positive impact of underwriter reputation in the NSOE market only, even after controlling for earnings quality. No significant correlation between underwriter reputation and post-IPO performance is found in the SOE market.
VI. Conclusions
Using a sample of 503 IPO issuers from 2002 to 2008, we find that underwriter reputation is negatively related to pre-IPO earnings management for NSOE issuers only. Moreover, underwriter reputation helps improve post-IPO performance, and the effect is beyond enhancing earnings quality in the NSOE market. In contrast, the effect of underwriter reputation on either pre-IPO earnings quality or post-IPO performance is not significant in the SOE market.
Evidence documented in this study reveals that in the NSOE market, earnings information is important for public investors of NSOEs. As such, investment banks are motivated to mitigate pre-IPO earnings management to build up their reputations. However, in the SOE market, issuers face a lower level of adverse selection by both investors and the CSRC. As a result, underwriters have less incentive to mitigate earnings management. While prior studies provide evidence of the relationship between underwriter reputation and earnings management in the developed market, they typically consider the market as a homogeneous whole. Our study helps us to better understand the role of underwriters in the transitional market. Moreover, it emphasizes the importance of the adverse selection bias faced by issuers in determining the role of underwriters in earnings management highlighting the importance of future research on the Chinese IPO market.
